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D uring Israel’s recent operation against Hamas in Gaza, the so-
called Operation Cast Lead which lasted from 
December 27, 2008 to January 18, 2009, Israe-
li-Turkish bilateral relations reached their low-
est point since the early 1990s. Now that all the 
dust has settled, it is becoming clear that al-
though the relationship did not touch bottom, 
it came dangerously close, particularly after 
the verbal spat between Israeli President Shi-
mon Peres and Turkish Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan at Davos. When similar inci-
dents took place over the last couple of years, 
for example when former Prime Minister Bül-
ent Ecevit called Israel’s response to the Second 
Intifada “genocidal” in 2002, and Prime Min-
ister Erdoğan accused Israel of committing 
“state terrorism” in 2004, diplomats on both 
sides always assured the international com-
munity and informed public opinion in Israel 
and Turkey that the strain on bilateral  ties was 
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only temporary and that relations would 
return to normal in the medium term. 
Indeed, Israelis, always at the receiving 
end of criticism emanating from Turkey 
in all such cases, made do with low pro-
file protests behind doors and refrained 
from escalating the crises. Diplomats 
and foreign policy commentators grew accustomed to reiterating the cliché that 
bilateral ties between Israel and Turkey could no longer be defined on the basis of 
strategic cooperation only, but had been diversified to a large extent to include the 
economy, culture, and tourism as well. The depth attained in all those areas, the 
argument went, would act as a cushion to soften the impact of occasional political 
differences of opinion between the Israeli and Turkish leadership.
The Lop-Sided Nature of Bilateral Ties
It is important at this point to consider Israel’s traditionally meek response to 
Turkish criticisms and admonitions. Why have Israelis tended to act as the junior 
party in this bilateral relationship? The answer to this question should be sought 
at a number of levels. First is Israel’s need for international legitimacy and recog-
nition as an equal partner by its neighbors. Since Israel’s foundation, Israeli gov-
ernments have had to wrestle with the problem of diplomatic recognition, which 
was subject to the ebbs and flows of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Each new bout of 
conflagration between Israel and its Arab neighbors resulted in a recall of ambas-
sadors and suspension of diplomatic ties by a host of African, Asian and Latin 
American countries. After the Yom Kippur War of 1973, for example, the number 
of countries that maintained diplomatic relations with the PLO nearly surpassed 
the number of foreign missions in Israel.1 Israel managed to sign peace treaties 
with two of its numerous former enemies, namely Egypt and Jordan, but even in 
those cases the exchange of ambassadors did not raise the level of bilateral ties 
beyond a cold peace. Therefore, maintaining full diplomatic ties with Turkey, a 
Muslim country with international stature, is a top foreign policy objective from 
the Israeli point of view, an objective which is as vital as the tangible Israeli interest 
in cooperation with Turkey in other fields.
In addition, Israel attaches great value to its strategic partnership with  Turkey at 
the military level. Military cooperation between Israel and Turkey is based on bi-
lateral agreements and has received the blessing and active support of the US since 
the late 1990s. Several Israeli fighter planes train at the Konya Airbase in Turkey 
every year, and both countries conduct joint naval exercises with the participation 
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of American warships in the Mediterra-
nean. As part of their strategic relation-
ship, Turkey and Israel share intelligence; 
Israelis must particularly appreciate 
Turkish reports from regions that Israel 
finds difficult to reach, such as Iran, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Central Asia.
At the economic level, trade between 
Turkey and Israel reached unprecedent-
ed heights in the early 2000s. Turkey is one of the major customers for the Israeli 
arms industry, having spent hundreds of millions of dollars to date on finished 
products and renovation projects. Although Turkey has threatened several times 
to tie its purchase of Israeli arms and services to the resolution of regional and 
bilateral problems, Israel still counts on Turkey as a valued client. And while Israel 
seems to have abandoned the option of buying fresh water from Turkey, at least 
for now, another project on the table aims to link southern Turkey with an Israeli 
port city – via Northern Cyprus – by means of multi-purpose underwater pipes 
that would transport water, oil and natural gas. Feasibility reports for this project 
are being prepared, but potentially it holds great promise for Israel’s standing in 
the region. If the pipeline could be extended to Israel’s southern port city of Eilat 
at a later stage, Israel could eventually become the energy hub for India, China and 
Japan, providing a safer alternative to Persian Gulf oil exports. The implications 
of this project for Israel’s international relations are obvious. Finally, Turkey offers 
comparatively cheap luxuries at close proximity to Israeli tourists, who have made 
this country their second favored destination after the US. This much needed out-
let also helps Israelis overcome their trauma of encirclement. Considering the fact 
that the airspace to the east of Israel is closed to civilian flights by El Al, opting to 
fly Turkish Airlines via Istanbul has become a popular shortcut for many Israeli 
passengers who want to fly to destinations in Australia, Asia and the Far East.
To put it briefly, all these factors have overlapped to give Turkey consider-
able leverage over Israel. The new balance of power in the Middle East in the 
2000s however, particularly the Turkish-Syrian rapprochement, diminished Tur-
key’s enthusiasm for concerted action with Israel. Alerted to the loss of appetite 
in their strategic partner, Israeli governments have displayed enormous sensitiv-
ity towards Turkish interests in recent years. Turkey has used this influence to 
successfully nip a potential Israeli-Kurdish alliance in the bud and to persuade 
Israel to use its influence in the American Congress to battle repeated attempts by 
American Armenians to have the events of 1915 recognized as genocide.
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Turkey’s Response to Operation Cast Lead     
Israel and Turkey reached a new level of cooperation after Israel’s evacuation 
of its settlements in the Gaza Strip in 2005. As a token of that positive mood, the 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs spent 2005, among other things of course, do-
ing diplomatic spadework to arrange a meeting between the Israeli and Pakistani 
foreign ministers in İstanbul.2 Likewise, Turkey took on a very active role in the 
Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian tracks as the facilitator country and hit the 
headlines in May 2008 with the spectacular success of bringing Israeli and Syr-
ian representatives together in Turkey in a series of mediated, indirect talks.3 As 
a matter of fact, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert paid a visit to Ankara just a week 
before Operation Cast Lead and participated in a diplomacy sprint which lasted 
until the small hours of the morning and nearly led to a meeting between himself 
and the Syrian foreign minister in Ankara.4
Israeli-Turkish bilateral relations were, however, tested severely in the first two 
months of 2009 in a very unexpected manner. The Turkish leadership, which had 
hosted the Israeli prime minister only a couple of days prior to the attacks, was 
taken completely by surprise by the breadth and forcefulness of the Israeli incur-
sion into Gaza. The operation was Israel’s most intense since conquering the little 
strip of land in May 1967. It resulted in an unprecedented number of Palestinian 
casualties, including hundreds of non-combatant civilians. Large sections of the 
strip lay in ruins and an estimated 50,000 Gazans were and still are displaced in-
ternally.
The official Turkish reaction to the events was swift. The Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister Erdoğan, Chairman of Parliament Köksal Toptan, 
and leaders of the opposition parties united in condemning the Israeli operation 
and calling for an immediate cease-fire. Prior to these events, Turkey had tradi-
tionally stayed away from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and had tried to main-
tain a balanced approach. Nevertheless, Turkey always showed solidarity with the 
Palestinian people and their representatives. Amity between the Turkish and Pal-
estinian peoples is rooted in the Turkish inclination to lend support to the weaker 
party in an international conflict, as well as in their common historical and reli-
gious ties. Actually, the very existence of that bond on the person to person level 
(although one is forced to admit that this has been a Turkish attitude toward the 
Palestinians rather than the other way round) has continuously shaped Turkish 
foreign policy vis-à-vis Israel and Palestinians as the most important factor in 
policy-making. 
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Particularly important this time, however, was the degree of anger displayed 
by the Turkish government, which could not simply be explained by reference to 
Turkey’s traditional sympathy for the Palestinians. At a public meeting with may-
oral candidates from the AKP ticket, which was broadcast live on several Turkish 
TV channels, PM Erdoğan condemned world media for being controlled by Israel 
and asked how Israel could still maintain its seat at the United Nations while flout-
ing so many of the Security Council’s decisions. He then went on to address the 
Israelis over the heads of their leadership by quoting the Sixth Commandment 
from the Decalogue both in English and in Hebrew.5 The fact that this must have 
been the first time a Turkish politician uttered a word in that language was in itself 
very symbolic and revealed how much PM Erdoğan was upset by the recent turn 
of events. He repeated his remarks to President Peres and the audience before 
storming off the stage at Davos.
Apparently, the official display of Turkish anger was due in large part to Israel’s 
obliteration of the regional environment which had made possible Turkey’s role as 
a mediator and facilitator between the Israelis and Syrians. Erdoğan did not mince 
words,  openly declaring that he had lost confidence in PM Olmert as a partner for 
peace and that he felt personally betrayed by the fact that he was not informed of 
the impending Israeli operation during Olmert’s visit to Ankara.6 Although those 
remarks targeted an outgoing prime minister, one rarely comes across such harsh 
statements among countries that define their relationship as a strategic partnership.
Nevertheless, all this looked calm and composed when compared to the out-
burst of hostility toward Israel in public rallies. The Turkish people, who rarely 
take to the streets, flocked to city squares all over Anatolia and protested against 
the Israeli operation in the strongest terms. Some of the protest meetings were 
organized by civil society institutions such as trade unions, professional organiza-
tions and bars, but the majority were inspired and carefully coordinated by the 
Anadolu Gençlik Derneği, an association indirectly linked with the Saadet Partisi 
(SP).7 Tens of thousands participated in one such rally in Ankara on January 19, 
20098 and another meeting in Diyarbakır drew a huge mass of people number-
ing 50,000 according to some estimates.9 Crowds in those meetings chanted pro-
Palestinian, anti-Israel and, occasionally, anti-Semitic slogans, and demanded the 
unilateral abolition of all existing treaties between Turkey and Israel.
An Incensed Israel
At this point, it is impossible to know the extent to which Turkey’s anger fac-
tored into Israeli policy-making and how much it mattered in the heat of the war. 
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In the first two weeks of Operation Cast 
Lead, PM Olmert and Foreign Minister 
Tsipi Livni attempted to close their eyes 
to the Turkish criticism. Standing his 
ground, Olmert pointed out the chal-
lenge posed by the approaching local 
elections to the AKP government and in-
structed his cabinet ministers to refrain 
from confronting Turkey publicly, tak-
ing into consideration the importance 
of Israel’s relationship with Turkey.10 In a 
similar fashion, President Peres continued to stick to his well-established mantra 
of great respect for Turkey and its leadership, and desire to improve ties with Tur-
key in spite of the public humiliation he had suffered at Davos.
Still, the contours of a new Israeli response started to take shape as the tone 
of the discourse in Turkey grew even harsher. The new Israeli policy is evidently 
being conducted at two levels, the official and the informal. At the official level, 
the Israeli leadership is sending mixed signals of optimism for the future and dis-
pleasure with the current Turkish reaction. In his address to the leaders of major 
American Jewish organizations on February 15 2009, for example, Olmert clari-
fied his position:
… regrettably [Operation Cast Lead] took place in the same week that I visited the 
Prime Minister of Turkey. The Prime Minister of Turkey was very unhappy and 
complaining how come I was visiting him on Monday and I didn’t tell him that we 
are going to attack the Palestinians in Gaza on Saturday… . The reason I didn’t tell 
him was twofold. One, is that on Monday I didn’t know that we would attack on 
Saturday… . But I also said, quite frankly, I didn’t call the President of the United 
States, my good friend George W. Bush, at that time, and say to him, I’m going to 
attack Gaza. I didn’t call my good friends Gordon Brown or Nicolas Sarkozy or 
Angela Merkel. Why should I say to any prime minister what the military plans 
of the State of Israel are for defending its citizens?… I don’t think that I had to do 
it and I was quite unhappy with the feelings that were expressed by the Turkish 
Prime Minister. We have good relations with Turkey… . we hope that the Prime 
Minister of Turkey will understand that there are certain constraints sometimes 
which forbid leaders of some nations from sharing the most sensitive secrets when 
there are secrets.11    
In other words, although Olmert still adopted a moderate approach to the prob-
lem, he did not include Erdoğan among his “good friends” and communicated 
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his own irritation at the Turkish discourse. Furthermore, Olmert’s speech can be 
read as an example of the Israeli astonishment at why, as they seem to take it, PM 
Erdoğan attributes to himself greater authority in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
than, let’s say, the leaders of the Quartet countries. Israeli Foreign Minister Livni, 
likewise, expressed her government’s desire to restore bilateral relations to the 
pre-2009 level, although she added that Israel expects Turkey to treat Israel with 
respect.12 In the same vein, the President’s Office in Israel confirmed that Peres 
called Erdoğan after the incident at Davos and underscored the significance of 
ties with Turkey for Israel, but it denied twice the validity of buzzing reports in the 
Turkish media that an apology had been extended as well.13  
Adding another layer of complexity, the moderation that characterizes Israel’s 
official response is not to be observed in other, informal signals coming from a 
variety of Israeli sources. To begin with, the Israeli population reacted sharply 
to PM Erdoğan’s criticisms and to the Davos fracas. The immediate impact of 
that popular reaction could be observed in the tourism field. Until recently, Tur-
key had ranked as the most popular destination for Israeli tourists, especially for 
short-term vacations. Nearly 500,000 Israelis visited Turkey —mainly Antalya—
last year, contributing an estimated $300 million to the Turkish economy.14 All 
this has come tumbling down as a result of the bitterness in bilateral relations. 
The Israeli National Security Council issued a warning to all Israelis that “… there 
were risks of ‘chance terror attacks’” in Turkey, the Philippines, Thailand and Uz-
bekistan, and asked all travelers to those countries to act with utmost care and 
precaution.15 One Israeli travel agency reported a fifty percent drop in reserva-
tions in January 2009 compared to the same month the previous year; another 
stated, “…  we have suspended all the negotiations we had been conducting with 
hotels for the upcoming spring and summer in Turkey” until they could be sure 
that “… it is comfortable and safe there and that we are wanted in that country.”16 
Not all the downturn is individually motivated; actually most of the tour packages 
are reserved at the workplace in Israel by trade unions and workers’ committees 
and the cancellations are usually due to the decisions taken collectively by those 
institutions. This is not to say that cancellations are part of a wider policy of offi-
cial reaction to Turkey, but one cannot overlook that possibility either since Israeli 
policymakers must have been briefed on Turkey’s economic vulnerability.
Much more serious than a setback in tourism, however, is the new, barely dis-
guised Israeli threat to reconsider their position regarding the Armenian claims. 
The traditional Israeli approach to the events of 1915 between the Ottoman gov-
ernment and Ottoman Armenians has been one of silence and non-recognition. 
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There are a number of Israeli reasons for not recognizing the 1915 events as geno-
cide, but, among other factors, pressure from Turkey seems to have played a major 
role in the formulation of this uneasy foreign policy decision, which has been 
severely criticized by many Israeli intellectuals, academics and political parties.17 
Israel’s resolute stand, nevertheless, was tested in the recent crisis and Israeli poli-
cymakers did not hesitate to add that the genocide issue could be put on the table 
if Turkish discourse becomes more aggressive. Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister, 
Majallie Whbee, the first Israeli Druze to rise so high in the political hierarchy, 
complained about Turkish critics, who argue that the Israeli operation in Gaza 
could be regarded as genocide, and warned explicitly that if such arguments per-
sist, “we will then recognize the Armenian-related events as genocide.”18 This 
grave threat, which, if carried out, could result in the severing of diplomatic ties 
between Israel and Turkey, is testimony to how seriously the current situation is 
being taken in Israel.
It cannot be mere coincidence that Deputy FM Whbee’s statement nearly over-
lapped with an even more impudent, and one has to say disrespectful, diplomatic 
coup de grâce from unexpected quarters. Israel’s Ground Forces Commander Ma-
Turkey cannot and need not refrain from criticizing Israeli operations in Gaza and the West Bank, 
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jor General Avi Mizrahi dropped a pro-
verbial bomb when he attacked Turkey 
as well as PM Erdoğan in person before 
an international audience in a lecture at 
the Tactical Command College on Feb-
ruary 10, 2009. Responding to Erdoğan’s 
harsh criticism of the Israeli operation, 
Mizrahi stated that Erdoğan “should first look in the mirror.”19 Then the general 
managed to rub salt in three wounds at the same time: he took Turkey to task by 
reminding Erdoğan of “the massacre of Armenians, the suppression of the Kurds 
and the occupation of Northern Cyprus,” implying that Turkey will not have the 
moral ground to preach to Israel until it deals with its own skeletons in the clos-
et.20 This statement marks the first instance of an unparalleled tone of official and 
popular reaction on the part of Turkey being matched by an equally strong Israeli 
rejoinder.
Turkey’s immediate reaction was to summon the Israeli ambassador in An-
kara, Gabi Levi, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ask for an explanation.21 
The Turkish General Staff, too, issued a statement condemning Mizrahi’s speech 
and demanding clarification as to whether Mizrahi spoke in the name of the IDF 
or not. The Israeli response crystallized in the following few days; Israeli Chief 
of Staff Lieutenant General Gabi Ashkenazi called his “… Turkish counterpart to 
apologize for the critical remarks made by … Mizrahi … . and assured him that 
Mizrahi’s remarks did not reflect the IDF’s official position, and that Israel high-
ly valued the strategic relationship it had forged over the years with the  Turkish 
military.”22 To those who are familiar with domestic politics in Israel and the rela-
tionship between the military and the civilian leadership, the notion of an Israeli 
general defying government policy on such a sensitive matter and censuring a 
foreign leader despite the wishes of elected politicians is hard to explain.23 Israeli 
generals do address foreign policy issues in public, but only to complement their 
governments’ stance on those issues, not to contradict it. Thus, although Mizrahi’s 
criticisms were later disowned by the authorities, it is extremely unlikely that he 
spoke only his mind, and without prior authorization. In any case, what was said 
was said and Ankara had a taste of what was in store if bilateral relations should 
deteriorate further. 
It is important to note at this point that there is a visible tendency in Israel 
to distinguish between the attitudes of the Turkish government and the Turkish 
military. Much of PM Erdoğan’s dressing-down is attributed to his pro-Palestinian 
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sentiments, the approaching Turkish lo-
cal elections, and to Turkey’s current in-
terest in winning hearts and minds in the 
Arab-Muslim world. Israel seems to con-
sider the Turkish military as its real part-
ner in Turkey and pays more attention to 
the General Staff ’s line of thought. In an 
important article published in Haaretz, 
Middle East correspondent Zvi Bar’el re-
ported that he had met with a military member of the Turkish National Security 
Council at the height of the crisis and that his unnamed source conveyed displea-
sure with the Turkish government’s policy vis-à-vis Israel thus:
You have to understand the historical aspect of our relations. We the Turks still 
have an Ottoman view of the region, whereby it’s more natural for us to have ties 
with Israel than with the Arab countries. … The Arabs’ betrayal of the empire is 
rooted in our consciousness. The cultural rivalry with Iran is also part of our in-
formal education. Israel and the Jews are our real allies. … Someone in [Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip] Erdogan’s government thought that he could use this threat 
[to suspend military projects with Israel]. We explained to him that he can say 
whatever he wants and we the Turkish military establishment will do what we need 
to do.24
The message of this interview is corroborated by the uninterrupted military coop-
eration between Turkey and Israel regardless of, and actually despite, the ongoing 
crisis among the politicians and the public at large.25 Turkish Undersecretary for 
the Defense Industry, Murad Bayar, likewise, stated that military cooperation be-
tween the two countries is based on long-term projects and that those projects will 
be carried out undisturbed as long as Turkey and Israel share mutual interests.26 
Mehmet Ali Kışlalı, a Turkish journalist known for echoing the military’s point 
of view, struck a similar note, expressing certainty that the damage done by Maj. 
Gen. Mizrahi’s remarks was now contained as a result of contacts between Turk-
ish and Israeli officials. He also added confidently that Mizrahi’s and Erdoğan’s 
remarks “would certainly not be permitted” to obstruct crucial ties in the field of 
security between two countries that need each other.27                   
Conclusion: A Time to Rend and a Time to Sew28
The sudden downturn in bilateral relations was welcomed by some commenta-
tors in Turkey29 and has led to the expectation that the blow dealt was fatal and, 
indeed, that the strategic cooperation between Turkey and Israel would not be 
We now observe the beginning 
of a new process of damage 
control and stabilization 
in diplomatic contacts, 
while military and security 
cooperation appear to have 
maintained business as usual
Between Crisis and Cooperation: The Future of Turkish-Israeli Relations
67
able to recover from its rupture in the 
first months of 2009. However, we can 
now surmise that such expectations are 
unwarranted; on the contrary, we now 
observe the beginning of a new process 
of damage control and stabilization in 
diplomatic contacts, while military and 
security cooperation appear to have 
maintained business as usual. A meeting between the Turkish and Israeli foreign 
ministers took place recently and was hailed as constructive.30 At the same time, 
Turkish President Abdullah Gül is making an effort to dissipate ill-feelings on 
both sides. One of the prominent leaders of the Jewish-Turkish community, Jak 
Kamhi, traveled to Israel and met President Peres and FM Livni, undoubtedly 
acting upon official authorization by the Turkish president.31 Turkish dailies have 
carried reports of Gül’s determination to pay a state visit to Israel before the end 
of 2009.32 
Therefore, we may conclude that the strategic relationship between Turkey and 
Israel has proven amazingly resilient in spite of colossal changes in the socio-
political and strategic map of the Middle East. Nevertheless, a realistic look at 
the basis for ongoing partnership is essential. Few of the factors that had made 
the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement possible in the early 1990s survive in the wake 
of 9/11. Today, Turkey’s rapport with Israel continues to be pegged to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and has been sour since the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 
2000. At a time when such structural factors constrain diplomatic ties, and com-
mon strategic interests are shrinking, the new basis for bilateral relations ought 
to be common values as much as common interests, if both Turkey and Israel are 
indeed committed to maintaining and extending cooperation in all fields. The 
obvious common values that both Turkey and Israel – alone – subscribe to in this 
region are multiparty democracy, rule of law, freedom of speech and press, and a 
strong civil society. Turkish-Israeli ties are likely to be restored if policymakers on 
both sides prepare a balance sheet now and try to learn from past mistakes in or-
der to prevent future crises. The Turkish side can contribute its share to the revival 
and extension of cooperation, if the following issues receive more attention:
Turkey cannot and need not refrain from criticizing Israeli operations in Gaza 
and the West Bank, especially when the toll on the civilian population is so high, 
and Israelis have shown enormous absorptive capacity so far in this regard. How-
ever, the latest crisis has demonstrated that Israel has red lines as well. First, while 
Turkey cannot and need not 
refrain from criticizing Israeli 
operations in Gaza and the 
West Bank, especially when the 
toll on the civilian population
is so high
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PM Erdoğan’s protest at Davos was not 
directed against President Peres person-
ally, Israelis on the street were hurt by 
what they perceived as an affront to their 
head of state. Turks, who are at least as 
sensitive about national honor as Israelis, 
should have no difficulty in understand-
ing this.33 The incident was doubly unfor-
tunate in that Shimon Peres happens to 
lend the most sympathetic and attentive ear to Turkey among those in the current 
Israeli leadership. Secondly, Turkish politicians and diplomats can make a greater 
impact on their Israeli counterparts if they formulate their criticisms by making 
reference to international law and universal human rights. The current tenden-
cy to couch condemnation of Israeli actions in religious language is dangerous, 
because recourse to religious vocabulary is destined to undercut the traditional 
Turkish policy of differentiating between Jews and Israel as well as Israeli citizens 
and Israeli governments. Reading passages from the Hebrew Bible (Lo tirtsah!) 
rests on the mistaken but widespread assumption that all Israelis are religious 
people,34 and can thus be moved by appealing to their religious sentiments.35 For 
the majority of Israelis, who are actually secular, the Hebrew Bible is nothing more 
than the national saga of the ancient Israelites. Furthermore, extremist groups on 
the right and the left in Turkey might take their cue from the inappropriateness of 
formulating such religion-based criticisms, and refrain from holding Jewish Turks 
accountable for Israel’s actions. The Turkish government and President Gül are 
already working hard to reassure this tiny community,36 but more has to be done 
in order to prevent a new wave of migration from Turkey.   
The AKP government made a grave mistake in the aftermath of the Israeli op-
eration in letting the initiative pass into the hands of the SP and its youth branch-
es, which fanned flames in the Turkish street. Turkish-Israeli ties should not be 
held hostage to the anti-Israeli, and occasionally anti-Semitic, discourse of minor 
parties and pressure groups on the extreme right and left of the Turkish political 
spectrum.    
While Turkey’s new interest in its relatively neglected Middle Eastern hinter-
land and its desire to mediate between conflicting parties in the region are com-
mendable developments, Turkey’s insistence on facilitating talks between Israelis 
and Palestinians, on the one hand, and Israelis and Syrians, on the other, should 
not take precedence over Turkey’s bilateral relations with Israel. Israeli govern-
ments have so far acceded to Turkey’s mediation attempts partly because they do 
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not want to rebuff a friendly country and 
partly with the hope that Turkey might 
indeed play a positive role as a result of 
the AKP government’s current regional 
popularity. The Olmert Government 
expected two specific outcomes from 
the Turkish mediation team: first, Israel 
asked for Turkish help for the return of 
the remains of an Israeli spy, Eli Kohen, hanged in Damascus in 1965; second, Is-
rael wished Turkey to negotiate a deal with Hamas for the release of the abducted 
Israeli soldier, Gil’ad Shalit, which would have been a most appreciated develop-
ment. In spite of numerous attempts, however, the Turkish Foreign Ministry has 
not yet been able to meet those expectations. In another equivocal move, Tur-
key sent a professional investigation team when the entire Muslim world reacted 
sharply to Israeli excavations near the Mugrabi Gate in the Old City of Jerusalem 
in 2007. The report of the team was not released to the public, but leaks in the 
Turkish press alleged that Israel was responsible for damage done to the historical 
fabric of the Haram al-Sharif. In theory, Israel could ‘fail to notice’ Turkish criti-
cism of its actions if Turkey could produce tangible benefits for Israel during the 
mediation process. But, realistically speaking, Turkey cannot continue to insist on 
a mediation role for itself while simultaneously maintaining a disparaging attitude 
toward Israel, particularly if it cannot deliver anything in return.37
In its role as mediator and facilitator between conflicting parties, Turkey should 
consult with countries such as Norway, which have accumulated experience in 
those fields. Norwegian interlocutors’ painstaking efforts in the making of the 
Oslo Accords in 1993, the first agreement between Israel and the PLO, should be a 
model for Turkey.38 Turkey has a lot to learn from the Norwegian example in im-
posing total secrecy and anonymity for the negotiating parties until an agreement 
is reached and enough time is given to politicians to sell it to their public. Turkey 
could have been more successful in the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Pakistani tracks 
if those channels of communication had not been leaked to the press prematurely, 
out of short-term political calculations in domestic politics.
Turkey can possibly make the greatest contribution in the Israeli-Palestinian 
track. Even there, Turkish mediators should brace for lengthy discussions and 
many culs-de-sac. Instead of focusing on spectacular meetings between Israeli and 
Palestinian leaders, a role that is likely to be claimed by the US, Turkey can con-
tribute to the dissemination of a peaceful environment by facilitating encounters 
between Israeli and Palestinian civil society institutions and opinion leaders on 
Turkey could have been more 
successful in the Israeli-Syrian
and Israeli-Pakistani tracks
if those channels of 
communication had not been 
leaked to the press prematurely
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Turkish soil. It is worth making use of Turkey’s strong civil society to project soft 
power on both the Israelis and Palestinians. The influential Union of Chambers 
and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), for example, initiated the Erez In-
dustrial Zone Project, promising much-needed jobs to Gazans. Similar projects in 
the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel are bound to bolster Turkey’s stature in the region 
and lend credibility to Turkish mediation efforts.  
Turkey’s willingness to assume a mediation role between Israel, the Palestin-
ians and Syria brings to mind the question of how prepared Turkish teams are for 
that task, which requires expertise in conflict resolution and intimate knowledge 
of historical and legal minutiae, not to speak of instilling confidence in the con-
flicting parties. Having instinctively adopted a more pro-Palestinian stance thus 
far, the AKP government is now slowly recognizing the problems posed by inter-
nal divisions among the Palestinians. It will soon be clear that the Fatah-Hamas 
division is only one of many. Fault lines separating Gazans from West Bankers, 
Palestinians in the occupied territories from Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, 
Palestinians in the occupied territories from Palestinians refugees in the Diaspora, 
and hamulas from one another will be activated when Israel and the Palestinians 
reach the final stage of peace negotiations. Are Turkish mediators ready to address 
that complex web of domestic fissures in Palestinian society? Are there any Turk-
ish scholarly experts on Palestinians who could assist Turkish mediators? 
A similar question arises regarding Turkey’s perception of Israeli domestic 
politics. Here Turkey’s contrast with Israel in the area of scholarship is striking. 
Dozens of Arabic, Persian and Turkish speaking Israeli academics and area spe-
cialists at Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Ben-Gurion Universities, as well as the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem follow the unfolding events in Middle Eastern countries 
on a daily basis and use those primary documents to produce first-rate scholarly 
works. While some of those studies are entirely academic, it is only natural that 
part of the motivation for this interest is rooted in the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
the desire of Israeli policymakers to receive updated information on the behavior 
of their political adversaries in the region. What is truly shocking is that Israel’s 
interest in the socio-cultural, economic and political life in its Arab and Muslim 
neighbors is not reciprocated at all, even for the sake of learning more about one’s 
current enemy. Jewish and Israeli studies as academic fields of inquiry do not 
exist in the Arab-Muslim Middle East.39 News from Israel and the Jewish world 
trickle down to Arab-Muslim decision-makers and societies through the lenses of 
highly opinionated diplomats, media reporters and Israel-illiterate think-tanks. 
In the absence of an academic, not necessarily objective but at least independent, 
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approach toward Israel, Arab and Muslim decision-makers usually miscalculate 
their moves, while public opinion is easily manipulated and fed distorted views. 
Unfortunately, Turkey is no exception to this sad state of affairs. At the moment, 
Turkey does not have even one scholarly expert on modern Israel, who can speak 
and read Hebrew, who spends even part of the year in Israel to make contacts with 
opinion leaders there, and who has an intimate knowledge of Israeli economy, 
literature, business community or academia. Objective and scholarly works on 
Jews and Israel are a rarity in the Turkish language, except for those translated 
from other languages. It is impossible to find Hebrew books in Turkish libraries.40 
This situation must change if Turkey is indeed determined to pursue an active role 
in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. A new generation of Ph.D. students 
should be encouraged to specialize on Israel by providing them with scholarships 
under the auspices of the Board of Higher Education or the Ministry of Education. 
Israel can also be asked, and will surely be willing, to contribute to this process by 
establishing a cultural center and a Hebrew library in Turkey. In the 1990s, Turk-
ish President Süleyman Demirel donated a special fund to Tel Aviv University to 
support Turkish studies in Israel. Now, Turkey can request a similar gesture from 
Israel – the foundation of an inter-university agency – to underwrite the costs of 
Jewish and Israeli studies in Turkey.
Whereas the recent crisis between Turkey and Israel led many observers to 
believe that the strategic partnership between the two countries has been dealt a 
fatal blow, it is now obvious that damage done is less than anticipated. Contacts 
between diplomats and ministers are geared towards damage control at the mo-
ment and the former level of cordiality should not be expected to return back in 
the short run. In a way, the crisis over Gaza has exposed the Achilles’s heel for this 
bilateral relationship; Turkish governments will always feel embarrassed of their 
ties with Israel as long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be rescued from 
the abyss to which it has descended. If President Obama can indeed override the 
Netanyahu government’s obstinacy and carry out his vision of a two-state solution 
to problem, Turkey and Israel could expand their partnership to become a model 
for the entire region.
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